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GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS IN 
TENNESSEE: FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 
CONCERNS & FEMINIST PRINCIPLES IN THE 
BALANCE 
JENNIFER S. WHITE* 
INTRODUCTION 
Surrogacy is a growing industry, yet it remains largely unregulated 
in the United States.1  Though there is no formal collection of statistics that 
track surrogate births in the U. S., estimates suggest that surrogate births 
doubled from 2004 to 2008, reaching approximately 1,000 births annually.2  
The law, however, has failed to keep pace with reproductive technology 
and surrogacy laws vary significantly from state to state.3  Consequently, 
the increase in surrogacy arrangements, combined with little to no 
regulation, creates significant confusion over whether or not varying types 
of surrogacy are legal from state to state.4  As a result, individuals seeking 
to start a family, and surrogates wishing to assist them, are left in legal 
uncertainty about their individual rights as well as their obligations toward 
each other.5  It is time for the Tennessee legislature to address the modern 
realities of surrogacy.  Doing so promptly will allow surrogates and 
intended parents greater certainty about the legality of surrogacy contracts 
                                                 
 *  J.D., Cum Laude, Belmont University College of Law (2015). I would like to 
thank my fiancé for all of his support. I would also like to thank the entire Belmont Law 
Review staff for their diligent work and Professor Usman for all of his guidance. 
 1. Sarah Mortazavi, It Takes A Village to Make A Child: Creating Guidelines for 
International Surrogacy, 100 GEO. L.J. 2249, 2250 (2012). 
 2. Magdalina Gugucheva, Surrogacy in America, COUNCIL FOR RESPONSIBLE 
GENETICS (2010), available at 
http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/pagedocuments/kaevej0a1m.pdf. 
 3. Jennifer Ludden, Who Is A Parent? Surrogate Technology Outpaces Law, NPR 
(April 13, 2012), available at http://www.npr.org/2012/04/14/150586618/legal-debate-over-
surrogacy-asks-who-is-a-parent. 
 4. Mark Hansen, As Surrogacy Becomes More Popular Legal Problems Proliferate, 
A.B.A. J. MAG., available at 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/as_surrogacy_becomes_more_popular_legal_p
roblems_proliferate/. 
 5. Alayna Ohs, The Power of Pregnancy: Examining Constitutional Rights in A 
Gestational Surrogacy Contract, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 339, 342 (2002). 
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through a balanced legislative approach that safeguards the interests of 
prospective parents and the surrogates who are assisting them. 
Surrogacy arrangements implicate freedom of contract 
considerations as well as concerns over the potential exploitation of 
women.6  Across the country, legislatures have struggled to strike the 
appropriate balance between allowing infertile couples to enter into these 
contracts as a means to exercise their right to create a family, while 
incorporating provisions to protect the rights of the surrogate.7  Due to the 
personal nature of surrogacy contracts and the substantial public policy 
considerations involved, it is vital to craft a comprehensive statute that 
allows for freedom of contract and protects fundamental constitutional 
rights.8  This is a particularly relevant concern in Tennessee since the 
legislature has recently implemented a statute regulating surrogacy,9 and 
two surrogacy cases have recently been argued before the Tennessee 
Supreme Court.10  Moreover, the Tennessee Constitution provides for 
greater privacy protections than the federal Constitution, and the Tennessee 
judiciary has a history of protecting the expansive privacy rights of 
Tennesseans.11  The right to privacy and the right to freedom of contract 
should be protected, but these rights should be balanced against competing 
public policy considerations.  Applying a feminist lens to the issue of 
surrogacy contracts in Tennessee is necessary to evaluate concerns over the 
potential exploitation of women in the surrogate birth process, while 
balancing these concerns against the rights of men and women to have 
greater access to reproductive choice. 
Drawing upon feminist theory and principles of freedom of 
contract, this Note proposes a new statutory framework for addressing 
surrogacy in the state of Tennessee.  Part I provides a balanced discussion 
of why couples choose surrogacy as well as varying types of surrogacy 
available to individuals.  Part II explores the judicial and legislative 
responses toward surrogacy contracts in the United States and discusses 
significant surrogacy litigation that continues to shape the public policy 
arguments surrounding this issue.  Part III provides background on 
                                                 
 6. In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1241 (N.J. 1988) (stating grounds for voiding 
contract include questions of voluntary consent in light of the significant compensation); In 
re Adoption of Paul, 550 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (1990) (holding surrogate may not be 
compensated because of the potential for intimidation); see Austin Caster, Don’t Split the 
Baby: How the U.S. Could Avoid Uncertainty and Unnecessary Litigation and Promote 
Equality by Emulating the British Surrogacy Law Regime, 10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 477, 509 
(2011). 
 7. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2258 (noting the struggle to balance enforcement of 
contracts with public policy concerns). 
 8. See Michelle Elizabeth Holland, Forbidding Gestational Surrogacy: Impeding the 
Fundamental Right to Procreate, 17 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 15 (2013). 
 9. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-402 (2013). 
 10. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005); In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 
2014). 
 11. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. 2000). 
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Tennessee’s approach to the right to privacy as well as recent surrogacy 
case law and legislation.  Part IV addresses feminist arguments as applied 
to surrogacy.  Part V offers a discussion of the intersection of freedom to 
contract and public policy concerns that influence the debate about whether 
or not surrogacy contracts should be legal.  Part VI recommends proper 
statutory language to regulate gestational surrogacy contracts in Tennessee. 
I. BACKGROUND 
It is crucial to have a basic familiarity with the medical definitions 
of surrogacy, as well as the reasons individuals pursue this reproductive 
method, in order to understand why comprehensive surrogacy legislation is 
necessary and how legal and feminist principles should contribute to this 
discussion.  The recommendation for a legislative amendment introduced in 
Part VI is grounded in these definitions of surrogacy and how they should 
influence regulation of the surrogate birth process in Tennessee. 
A. Choosing Surrogacy 
Due to technological advancements and emerging acceptance of 
surrogate arrangements, surrogacy has become increasingly popular in the 
United States.12  In fact, the number of babies resulting from gestational 
surrogacy has more than doubled in the past seven years.13  One of the 
reasons for this increase is the appeal of gestational surrogacy to infertile 
individuals who desire to start a family.  According to Resolve, an 
organization that advocates on behalf of individuals suffering from 
reproductive disorders, infertility affects approximately 7.3 million people 
in the United States.14  Many infertile couples view surrogacy as an 
alternative to adoption, which is often a lengthy process that can take one to 
two years to complete.15  Demand in the adoption market is increasing, and 
                                                 
 12. The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, Surrogacy: A 21st Century Human 
Rights Challenge (last visited January 17, 2015), available at http://www.cbc-
network.org/issues/making-life/surrogacy/; see also, Jessica Arons, Future Choices: Assisted 
Reproductive Technologies and the Law, Center for American Progress (Dec. 2007), 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/report/2007/12/17/3728/future-
choices-assisted-reproductive-technologies-and-the-law/ (noting the steady increase in 
surrogate births). 
 13. According to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, there was an 
increase from 738 births in 2004 to 1,593 births in 2011. Joan Cary, Surrogate Births 
Growing in Popularity, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-
10-09/health/ct-x-1009-surrogate-20131009_1_illinois-gestational-surrogacy-act-egg-
options-shirley-zager 
 14. Alex Kuczynski, Her Body, My Baby, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 28, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/30/magazine/30Surrogate-t.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
 15. Adoptive Families, Timing of Adoption Update: 2010–2011, 
http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/articles.php?aid=2351 (last visited March 7, 2014); see 
also Jane E. Brody, Since Baby M, Much Movement in Surrogacy, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
2009, at D7. 
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currently “for every Caucasian newborn put up for adoption, there are 75 
couples wanting to adopt.”16  This contributes to the long waiting time for 
intended parents seeking a child, and occasionally results in couples 
dropping out of the adoption process in favor of surrogacy.17  Couples 
struggling with infertility issues may also choose surrogacy because of their 
desire to create children genetically related to their family.18 
Individuals may also pursue surrogacy for non-medical reasons.  
One of the most common non-medical reasons for pursuing surrogacy is an 
individual’s inability to conceive based on situational reasons.19  For 
example, an individual may be single and prefer to raise a child alone, or 
the intended parents may be a couple in a homosexual relationship.20  
Persons in these situations are unable to give birth to a child without the 
assistance of reproductive technology.  Similar to the rationale expressed by 
heterosexual married couples, single individuals and same-sex couples may 
choose surrogacy because they would prefer to have a biological 
relationship with their child rather than adopt.21  By contrast to heterosexual 
married couples, however, it can be extremely difficult for single 
individuals and same-sex couples to adopt a newborn in the United States, 
if the intended parents already have a child, are advanced in age, or if they 
do not have a traditional marriage.22  Additionally, single individuals23 and 
couples in same-sex relationships are often prohibited from adopting 
internationally.24  Thus, the unique struggles single individuals and same-
sex couples face when trying to adopt may make surrogacy an appealing 
option. 
The decision to pursue surrogacy is not entered into lightly by 
prospective parents.25  Often intended parents choose this option after years 
of failed fertility treatments or difficulty finding a child to adopt.26  
Surrogacy is a complicated process, yet couples are willing to go through 
various medical procedures, sign a variety of legal documents, and pay 
                                                 
 16. STACY ZIEGLER, PATHWAYS TO PARENTHOOD: THE ULTIMATE GUIDE TO 
SURROGACY 42 (2005). 
 17. See ZARA GRISWOLD, SURROGACY WAS THE WAY: TWENTY INTENDED MOTHERS 
TELL THEIR STORIES 138 (2006). 
 18. See id. at 268. 
 19. MARY BRIODY MAHOWALD, BIOETHICS AND WOMEN: ACROSS THE LIFE SPAN 101 
(2006). 
 20. Id. at 92. 
 21. Brody, supra note 15. 
 22. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 42. 
 23. Children of All Nations, Single Parent Adoption, 
http://childrenofallnations.com/adoption-programs/singles/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2015). 
 24. Rachel Stewart Johnson, A same-sex couple’s struggle to adopt, JOHNS HOPKINS 
MAGAZINE, Fall 2013, available at http://hub.jhu.edu/magazine/2013/fall/gay-couple-
adoption#. 
 25. See generally Griswold, supra note 17, at 14. 
 26. See Kuczynski, supra note 17 (describing years of struggling with infertility and a 
miscarriage); see also Cary, supra note 13 (addressing the difficulties of adoption). 
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significant sums of money simply to experience the joy of having 
children.27 
B. Types of Surrogacy 
After the intended parents make the decision to pursue surrogacy, 
they must choose the woman who will carry their child.  This is an 
intensely personal decision made even more difficult by the accompanying 
legal complexities.  The intended parents must also select the type of 
surrogacy that best suits their situation.28 
i. Voluntary and Commercial Surrogacy 
Voluntary surrogacy involves the intended parents contracting for a 
surrogate birth with a woman they already know.29  This woman is typically 
a friend or relative that is willing to gestate the fetus without receiving 
compensation.30  Intended parents may prefer voluntary surrogacy because 
it significantly reduces the cost of the process31 and may decrease the 
likelihood of conflict after the birth.32  The fact that several states have 
criminalized commercial surrogacy may also lead intended parents to 
consider voluntary surrogacy in order to comply with state law and avoid 
civil or criminal penalties.33 
Alternatively, intended parents may choose to pursue commercial 
surrogacy.  In a commercial surrogacy arrangement, the intended parents 
contact a surrogacy agency that assists the intended parents in finding an 
appropriate surrogate.34  When such an agency is used, the intended parents 
have no previous relationship with the surrogate, and most often do not 
wish to have an ongoing relationship with the surrogate after the birth of the 
child.35  Once the agency matches a surrogate with the intended parents, 
legal contracts are drafted detailing the rights and responsibilities of all 
                                                 
 27. See generally Griswold, supra note 17, at 14. 
 28. Mahowald, supra note 19, at 95 (noting the complex medical and ethical 
considerations involved in surrogacy). 
 29. RICHARD HEDGES, BIOETHICS, HEALTH CARE, AND THE LAW: A DICTIONARY 200 
(1999). 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Ziegler, supra note 16, at 47–52; Stephanie Saul, Building a Baby, With Few 
Ground Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/13/us/13surrogacy.html?_ r=1&pagewanted=all (noting 
that the fees paid for the donor eggs and surrogate’s time and services are often the largest 
expenses associated with surrogacy). 
 32. Caster, supra note 6, at 477 (describing a surrogate that attempted to abduct a child 
born of a voluntary surrogacy agreement). 
 33. See infra notes 51–57. 
 34. Hedges, supra note 29, at 200. 
 35. Id. 
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parties involved.36  Commercial surrogacy contracts also specify how 
medical expenses are to be paid as well as any other compensation 
provisions.37  In the United States, a surrogate is typically paid $20,000-
$25,000, approximately $3.00 per hour that she is pregnant.38  Despite the 
benefits of compensation, there is currently more demand for commercial 
surrogates than supply.39 
ii. Traditional v. Gestational Surrogacy 
In a traditional surrogacy arrangement, the intended father’s sperm, 
or the sperm of an anonymous donor, is used to fertilize a surrogate’s 
ovum, which the surrogate will then carry to term.40  This process is called 
artificial insemination and involves inserting the sperm into the surrogate’s 
uterus to fertilize the surrogate’s egg by medical, as opposed to coital, 
means.41  Thus, the resulting child is genetically linked to both the intended 
father, or sperm donor, and the surrogate, but has no genetic ties to the 
intended mother.42 
By contrast, in gestational surrogacy, the intended mother’s ova are 
fertilized outside the womb with the intended father’s sperm and then 
implanted in the uterus of the surrogate.43  Alternately, the sperm and egg 
for this procedure can be obtained from donors.44  This procedure is known 
as in vitro fertilization.45  In this situation the resulting child may be 
biologically linked to both intended parents while the surrogate has no 
genetic ties to the child.46 
                                                 
 36. Id. 
 37. Ziegler, supra note 16, at 26–39. 
 38. The Center for Bioethics and Culture Network, Surrogacy: A 21st Century Human 
Rights Challenge, available at http://www.cbc-network.org/issues/making-life/surrogacy/. 
 39. Id. 
 40. The term “traditional” is used to indicate the original approach to surrogacy 
arrangements. Gestational surrogacy was not used in the United States until 1985. See Office 
of Tech. Assessment, U.S. Congress, Infertility: Medical and Social Choices 36 (1988), 
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_3/DATA/1988/8822.PDF [hereinafter 
“Infertility”]. 
 41. Id. at 26–28. 
 42. Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status as Legal or Natural 
Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R.5th 567, 574 § 2[a] (2000). 
 43. Infertility, supra note 40, at 123. 
 44. This would result in the intended parents lacking any genetic relationship to the 
child. F. Zegers-Hochschild et al., International Committee for Monitoring Assisted 
Reproductive Technology (ICMART) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Revised 
Glossary on ART Terminology, 2009, 24 HUM. REPROD. 2683, 2686 (2009), available at 
http:// www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/infertility/art_terminology.pdf. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Unless donors are used, the resulting child will be genetically linked to both 
intended parents. See Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2254 (“At any time, as many as five 
individuals could be involved: the surrogate, an anonymous sperm donor, an anonymous egg 
donor, the intended mother, and the intended father. Because of the range of potential 
genetic relations, gestational surrogacy can present legal problems that are relatively easy 
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II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO THE LEGALITY OF 
SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
An understanding of how other states and legislatures have dealt 
with surrogacy laws is necessary to formulate the best approach for 
Tennessee.  This section provides a discussion of legislative and judicial 
responses to surrogacy contracts in other jurisdictions.  The disparate 
approaches utilized in other states, as well as the increasing popularity of 
surrogacy, suggest that Tennessee should promptly create comprehensive 
surrogacy legislation. 
A. Legislative Response to Surrogacy Contracts 
Since no federal statute addresses surrogacy, regulation of 
surrogacy contracts is left solely to the discretion of state legislatures.47  As 
a result, there are many inconsistencies in the state regulation of surrogacy 
contracts across the United States.48  While some states strictly define and 
regulate surrogacy, others have yet to create any laws pertaining to the 
matter.49 
Some states proscribe surrogacy altogether, and penalize 
individuals that enter into such contracts under criminal or civil sanctions.  
For example, New York50 and Michigan51 both banned surrogacy as 
violative of public policy.  In Michigan, the state with the toughest penalties 
for surrogacy, individuals that enter into surrogacy contracts may be 
ordered to pay a fine of up to $10,000, and sentenced to a year in prison, 
while those who facilitate a surrogacy arrangement may be subject to 
penalties five times greater.52  Other states, including Arizona,53 Indiana,54 
North Dakota,55 and Ohio,56 explicitly proscribe all forms of surrogacy, yet 
                                                                                                                 
(both parents genetically related to the child) or relatively difficult (neither parent genetically 
related to the child) to resolve, from immigration issues to custody disputes.”). 
 47. Caster, supra note 6, at 504. 
 48. Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-by-State Survey of 
Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 454 
(2009). 
 49. Id. 
 50. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 122 (McKinney 2014). 
 51. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.855 (2011). 
 52. Facilitators, which could include attorneys and medical professionals, may be 
subject to pay up to $50,000 in fines and serve up to five year in prison. Id. 
 53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-218 (2007). The Arizona Court of Appeals held that 
this statute violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution because it did not 
allow the intended mother to prove maternity through genetic testing despite allowing 
intended fathers to prove paternity. Soos v. Super. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Maricopa, 897 P.2d 
1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). 
 54. IND. CODE § 31-20-1-1(1)-(8) (2009). 
 55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-05 (2013). This statute states that surrogacy contracts 
are void and that the surrogate and her husband will be considered the lawful parents of a 
child born as a result of a surrogacy contract. 
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do not impose penalties for entering into surrogacy contracts; rather, these 
states refuse to enforce such contracts. 
Taking a somewhat more moderate approach, four states ban only 
commercial surrogacy and authorize surrogacy contracts that do not involve 
compensation.  Since Kentucky,57 Louisiana,58 Nebraska,59 and 
Washington60 only proscribe surrogacy for compensation, uncompensated 
surrogacy is presumed to be legal in these states, though statutory 
provisions do not provide a regulatory scheme. 
On the other hand, a few states have explicitly authorized non-
commercial surrogacy and provided for its regulation, including: 
Arkansas,61 Florida,62 Nevada,63 New Hampshire,64 and Virginia.65  For 
example, Florida requires: all parties must be at least 18 years of age and 
undergo counseling; the intended mother cannot gestate the pregnancy; the 
surrogate must agree to “reasonable medical evaluation;” the intended 
parents must agree to accept all legal parental rights; and the gestational 
surrogate must agree to relinquish all parental rights.66  Virginia also 
imposes stringent statutory requirements on non-commercial surrogacy 
contracts: the intended mother must be infertile; the intended parents must 
be married; all parties must undergo counseling; and the surrogate must 
have given birth to a live child at least once before.67  Additionally, both 
Florida68 and Virginia69 require judicial approval of non-commercial 
surrogacy contracts. 
Only three states explicitly permit commercial surrogacy: Illinois,70 
Texas,71 and Utah.72  The Illinois surrogacy statute establishes notable 
restrictions on commercial surrogacy arrangements, and remains the most 
comprehensive regulatory framework in the country.73  Under Illinois law, 
only gestational surrogacy is sanctioned; the intended parents and the 
                                                                                                                 
 56. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (West 2001). This statute also allows the 
surrogate to obtain custody of the child born as a result of the surrogate birth process. 
 57. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590 (West 2005). 
 58. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713 (1987). 
 59. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2008). 
 60. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2014). 
 61. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-201 (1987). 
 62. FLA. STAT. § 742.15 (2014). 
 63. NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.710 (2013). In 2013, this statute was amended to allow 
unmarried persons to enter into non-commercial surrogacy contracts. Commercial surrogacy 
is still prohibited. 
 64. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 (2014). 
 65. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160 (2010). 
 66. FLA. STAT. § 742.15. 
 67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160. 
 68. FLA. STAT. § 742.16 (2010). 
 69. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-160. 
 70. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/25(b)(4) (2011). 
 71. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (2014). 
 72. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803 (West 2012). 
 73. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/25(b)(4). 
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surrogate must submit to psychiatric assessments; and surrogacy contracts 
may only be entered into when the intended parents cannot otherwise 
conceive.74  Texas75 and Utah76 also place physical and mental fitness 
restrictions on intended parents and surrogates.  Additionally, Texas and 
Utah only allow surrogacy if the intended mother cannot gestate the fetus to 
term and also require a home study of the intended parents’ residence.77 
Over thirty states do not have any laws directly governing 
surrogacy.78  States without surrogacy legislation may look to the 1975 
Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”) as persuasive authority for guidance on 
how to interpret surrogacy contracts.79  The UPA authorizes commercial 
gestational surrogacy agreements only when the intended mother 
establishes that she is unable to gestate a fetus to term.80  Additionally, 
states may look to the American Bar Association’s model surrogacy statute 
for guidance in surrogacy cases.81  This model statute permits commercial 
surrogacy and establishes that intended parents are the legal parents of the 
resulting child.82  As of yet, no state has adopted this model statute.83 
B. Judicial Response to Surrogacy Contracts 
The enforceability of both traditional and gestational surrogacy 
contracts has generated heated discussion by legal scholars and 
legislators.84  Since many states do not have laws that adequately address 
surrogacy, it is often left up to the courts to determine whether or not the 
contracts should be enforced.85  Two famous cases brought the issue of 
surrogacy contracts to national public attention: In re Baby M and Johnson 
v. Calvert.86  Both cases addressed the enforceability of surrogacy contracts 
                                                 
 74. Id. 
 75. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756. 
 76. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803. 
 77. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/25(b)(4). 
 78. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2261. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Uniform Parentage Act § 803(b)(2) (1975) (amended 2002). 
 81. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reprod. Tech. (Feb. 2008), available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf; see also Christine Metteer 
Lorillard, Informed Choices and Uniform Decisions: Adopting the ABA’s Self-Enforcing 
Administrative Model to Ensure Successful Surrogacy Arrangements, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 237, 2576–82 (2010). 
 82. ABA Model Act Governing Assisted Reprod. Tech., supra note 81. 
 83. Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 97, 111 (2010). 
 84. Molly J. Walker Wilson, Precommitment in Free-Market Procreation: Surrogacy, 
Commissioned Adoption, and Limits on Human Decision Making Capacity, 31 J. LEGIS. 329, 
329–30 (2005). 
 85. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2258. 
 86. Id. at 2262–65; In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 
P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
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and dealt with public policy arguments that highlighted the complex nature 
of surrogacy. 
i. In re Baby M. 
In re Baby M required a U.S. court to address the enforceability of 
a commercial surrogacy contract for the first time in the nation’s history.87  
The case involved a traditional surrogacy contract between the surrogate, 
Mary Beth Whitehead, and the intended father, Mr. Stern.88  Mrs. 
Whitehead signed a contract, which stated that in exchange for $10,000 and 
payment of all costs incurred during pregnancy, she would bear a child for 
the Sterns and agree to terminate her parental rights.89  After Mrs. 
Whitehead was artificially inseminated, however, she changed her mind 
and decided to retain custody of the child.90 
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that surrogacy contracts were 
invalid and unenforceable on public policy grounds.91  Specifically, the 
court found that surrogacy contracts were void because they violated 
policies concerning the consent of the surrogate to surrender the child.92  
According to the court’s reasoning, a woman could not give full and 
informed consent to the contract before it was performed since she would 
be incapable of knowing how pregnancy would affect her.93  The court also 
held that surrogacy contracts contravened public policy because they sought 
to permanently separate a child from its birth mother.94  Additionally, the 
court expressed concerns that enforcing such contracts would lead to the 
exploitation of economically disadvantaged women.95  Finally, the court 
compared surrogacy to “baby-selling,” arguing that state laws prohibiting 
the sale of babies also applied to surrogacy contracts.96 
                                                 
 87. 537 A.2d at 1227. 
 88. Id. at 1235 (Mr. Stern was married, but his wife was not a party to the contract 
despite the fact that she intended to be the child’s adopted mother). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1236. 
 91. See id. at 1246–48. 
 92. In re Baby M, A.2d at 1247–48. 
 93. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 1247–48 (“Under the contract, the natural mother is 
irrevocably committed before she knows the strength of the bond with her child. She never 
makes a totally voluntary, informed decision.”). The court relied on this rationale despite the 
fact that the surrogate had already successfully given birth to at least one child. Id. at 1236. 
 94. Id. at 1246–47 (“To the extent possible, children should remain with and be 
brought up by both of their natural parents.”). 
 95. Id. at 1248. 
 96. Id. (“This is the sale of a child, or, at the very least, the sale of a mother’s right to 
her child, the only mitigating factor being that one of the purchasers is the father. Almost 
every evil that prompted the prohibition on the payment of money in connection with 
adoptions exists here.”). 
  Even before the New Jersey Supreme Court reached this decision, other state 
legislatures had grappled with this divisive issue. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacy and the 
Politics of Commodification, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 117 (2009). In fact, twenty-
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ii. Johnson v. Calvert 
Five years after the In re Baby M decision, the enforceability of a 
commercial surrogacy contract was again litigated in Johnson v. Calvert.97 
By contrast, this dispute involved gestational surrogacy.98  In Johnson v. 
Calvert, Mr. and Mrs. Calvert agreed to pay the gestational surrogate, Mrs. 
Johnson, $10,000 in cash and buy her a $200,000 life insurance policy in 
exchange for her agreement to gestate the fetus and relinquish all parental 
rights.99  Mrs. Johnson signed the contract and underwent successful in 
vitro fertilization four days later.100  The relationship between the parties 
became strained, however, when the Calverts learned that Mrs. Johnson had 
previously experienced miscarriages and stillbirths.101  Additionally, the 
Calverts did not obtain the life insurance policy as promised.102  Frustrated 
by this lack of payment, Mrs. Johnson insisted on immediate payment of 
the life insurance policy or she would retain custody of the child.103 
In upholding the surrogacy contract, the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that a surrogate with no genetic ties to a child could not have 
parental rights.104  Moreover, the court refuted public policy arguments 
against surrogacy based on potential psychological harm to the surrogate, 
fears of exploiting or dehumanizing women, and the possibility that 
surrogacy contracts could encourage society to view children as 
commodities.105  While the court conceded that some of these harms were 
possible, it did not find sufficient evidence of these harms to warrant 
invalidating the surrogacy contract.106  Finally, the court concluded it was 
not the job of the judiciary to make policy decisions regarding the 
appropriateness of surrogacy contracts and reiterated the need for 
legislative guidance.107 
                                                                                                                 
seven states considered anti-surrogacy legislation, and six state legislatures ultimately 
created laws banning commercial surrogacy arrangements because of similar public policy 
concerns. Id.; DIEDERIKA PRETORIUS, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: A WORLDWIDE VIEW OF 
THE ISSUES 55 (1994). 
 97. 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993) (en banc). 
 98. Id. at 778. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778. 
 103. Id. at 778. 
 104. Id. at 782. The court also pointed out that the child would not have been born but 
for the efforts of the intended parents. Id. 
 105. Id. at 784–85. 
 106. Id. at 785 (“The limited data available seem to reflect an absence of significant 
adverse effects of surrogacy on all participants.”). 
 107. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 787. (“It is not the role of the judiciary to inhibit the use of 
reproductive technology when the Legislature has not seen fit to do so; any such effort 
would raise serious questions in light of the fundamental nature of the rights of procreation 
and privacy.”). 
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III. THE STATE OF SURROGACY LAW IN TENNESSEE 
While the first gestational birth in the United States occurred thirty 
years ago,108 many states have not adapted their laws to appropriately 
address the issue of surrogacy.109  In the wake of prominent surrogacy 
decisions, many states have dealt with surrogacy directly, by either making 
the practice legal110 or criminalizing certain types of surrogacy 
agreements,111 while others have yet to substantively address the issue.112 
Tennessee recently authorized traditional surrogacy contracts, but failed to 
explicitly address gestational surrogacy contracts, relegating them to a 
quasi-legal status.113  Surveying current Tennessee jurisprudence, an 
attorney would discover that limited case law and imprecise statutes are her 
only guide when assisting clients who desire to enter into surrogacy 
contracts. 
A. The Right to Privacy under the Tennessee Constitution 
Though the Tennessee Constitution and the U.S. Constitution are 
similar in form and purpose, they are not necessarily coextensive.114 
Tennessee’s Constitution ensures Tennesseans do not have fewer rights 
than those outlined in the U.S. Constitution.115  The Tennessee Supreme 
Court has stated, “Tennessee constitutional standards are not destined to 
walk in lock step with the uncertain and fluctuating federal standards and 
do not relegate Tennessee citizens to the lowest levels of constitutional 
protection, those guaranteed by the national constitution.”116  Indeed, the 
Tennessee Constitution guarantees more extensive freedoms in some 
instances.117  When the federal and state constitutional provisions are 
similar, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court has recognized the value of 
                                                 
 108. Infertility, supra note 40, at 36. 
 109. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2258. 
 110. Such as Texas, Utah, and Illinois. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.756 (2014); 750 
ILL. COMP. STAT. § 47/25 (2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-803 (West 2012). 
 111. Examples include Kentucky, Louisiana, Nebraska, and Washington which all 
proscribe commercial surrogacy arrangements. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (West 
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2712 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21-200 (2008); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2010). 
 112. Mortazavi, supra note 1, at 2258. 
 113. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-402 (2013). 
 114. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992). 
 115. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 14–15 (Tenn. 
2000) (“[N]o Tennessee law, whether statute, rule, or constitution, may operate to deprive a 
Tennessean any right afforded by the federal constitution.”). 
 116. State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166, 193 (Tenn. 1991). 
 117. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn., 38 S.W.3d at 13. 
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looking to case law interpreting the U.S. Constitution as a guide to 
interpreting Tennessee constitutional provisions.118 
The line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions establishing a right to 
privacy began with Meyer v. Nebraska119 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,120 
where, respectively, the Court held that parents have a constitutionally 
derived right to control the upbringing and education of their children.121 
Next in this line of cases is Skinner v. Oklahoma, which called into question 
the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s practice of sentencing habitual 
criminals to compulsory sterilization.122  Since Oklahoma’s statute 
restricted procreation and was applied unequally,123 the Court found the 
statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds and held that the right 
to procreate is “one of the basic civil rights.”124  Following these cases 
establishing procreative freedoms, Griswold v. Connecticut established a 
right to privacy for married couples, specifically allowing married couples 
access to contraceptives.125  Relying on this precedent, the Supreme Court 
later held that the right to privacy also includes the right of single persons to 
access contraceptives126 as well as a woman’s right to manage and control 
various aspects of her pregnancy, including the right to terminate a 
pregnancy.127 
In a relatively recent line of cases, the Tennessee Supreme Court 
has suggested that the right to privacy may be more extensive under the 
state constitution than under the federal constitution.128  For example, in 
Davis v. Davis the Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the right to privacy 
under the Tennessee Constitution is similar to the protections provided by 
the federal constitution.129  Specifically, the court stated: 
                                                 
 118. Id. at 12 (“[A]nalysis of case law interpreting the federal constitution is often a 
first step in interpreting provisions of our own constitution that are similar in wording, 
intent, or purpose.”). 
 119. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 120. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 121. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35. 
 122. 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942). 
 123. Id. White-collar criminals were not subject to forced sterilization and the policy 
was apparently grounded solely in eugenics. 
 124. Id. at 541. 
 125. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). Justice Goldberg emphasized 
the private nature of contraceptive decisions, noting “Of this whole ‘private realm of family 
life’ it is difficult to imagine what is more private or more intimate than a husband and 
wife’s marital relations.” Id. at 495 (J. Goldberg concurring). 
 126. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454–55 (1972) (holding that providing 
“dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who are similarly situated” violates 
the Equal Protection Clause). 
 127. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 128. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn. v. Sundquist, 38 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn. 2000) 
(citing other recent privacy decisions in Tennessee). 
 129. 842 S.W.2d 588, 600 (Tenn. 1992) (recognizing that the right to privacy exists 
under the Tennessee constitution). 
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Undoubtedly, that right to privacy incorporates some of the 
attributes of the federal constitutional right to privacy and, 
in any given fact situation, may also share some of its 
contours. As with other state constitutional rights having 
counterparts in the federal bill of rights, however, there is 
no reason to assume that there is a complete congruency.130 
Accordingly, the court recognized the right to procreational autonomy is a 
fundamental right protected by the federal constitution as well as the state 
constitution, while not specifically foreclosing the possibility that the right 
to privacy may indeed be greater in the state of Tennessee.131 
Eight years later, in Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist, the 
Tennessee Supreme Court reaffirmed the approach it utilized in Davis.132 
Here, the court specifically rejected the privacy analysis advocated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Casey v. Planned Parenthood.133  The court 
reasoned, “a woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy and an individual’s 
right to procreational autonomy are similar in nature” and accordingly 
applied the standard used in Davis.134  Thus, the court again suggested, 
without fully developing the legal theory, that Tennesseans enjoy greater 
privacy protections.  Since boundaries of the right to privacy in Tennessee 
apparently exceed those federally protected, the outer limits of this right 
should extend far enough to include the right to enter surrogacy contracts. 
Due to Tennessee’s heightened privacy protections, it follows that 
this state would have an interest in protecting gestational surrogacy 
contracts.135  These contracts seek to assist couples in exercising their 
procreational autonomy, which the Tennessee Supreme Court has held to be 
a fundamental constitutional right in Davis and Planned Parenthood. 
Currently, however, there is no comprehensive statutory regulation scheme 
for surrogacy contracts in Tennessee.  An examination of the current law is 
necessary to understand how a properly drafted statute could ensure that 
Tennesseans can fully enjoy the procreational autonomy explicitly 
protected in this state. 
B. Surrogacy Case Law in Tennessee 
It is difficult to derive legal precedent from surrogacy litigation. 
Typically, the holdings in such cases are narrowly tailored and exceedingly 
fact specific.136  Two Tennessee cases, In re C.K.G.137 and In re Baby,138 
                                                 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 12. 
 133. Planned Parenthood of Middle Tenn., 38 S.W.3d at 12. 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 12. 
 136. Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy 
Contracts, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1226–27 (1997). 
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focused on the enforceability of surrogacy arrangements, yet failed to 
provide clear precedent. 
i. In re C.K.G. 
The Tennessee Supreme Court was first presented a disputed 
surrogacy arrangement in 2005.139  In this unusual case, the intended 
mother gave birth to triplets who were not genetically related to her.140  The 
triplets were created using the egg of a donor and the sperm of the intended 
father, who was the intended mother’s boyfriend.141  Thus, due to her lack 
of genetic connection to the children she gave birth to, the intended mother 
in this case was effectively in the legal position that a gestational surrogate 
would normally occupy.142  When the relationship between the intended 
mother and father deteriorated, the intended mother filed a parentage action 
seeking custody and child support from the intended father.143  However, 
the intended father of the children claimed the intended mother had no 
standing under Tennessee law since she lacked a genetic connection to the 
children.144 
The court noted “Tennessee’s parentage and related statutes do not 
contemplate many of the scenarios now made possible by recent 
developments in reproductive technology.”145  At that time, the Tennessee 
parentage statute defined “mother” as “the biological mother of a child born 
out of wedlock,”146 and “parent” was defined as “the biological mother or 
biological father of a child, regardless of the marital status of the mother 
and father.”147  Noting that neither of these statutory definitions nor a 
review of legislative history provided guidance in the case at hand, the 
court looked to case law from other jurisdictions that had faced similar 
disputes.148  The court ultimately adopted a four-factor test to use in 
determining parentage in a surrogacy arrangement, and found the intended 
                                                                                                                 
 137. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714 (Tenn. 2005). 
 138. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014). 
 139. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 714. 
 140. Id. at 717–18. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 720 (“Our case is closer in kind to ‘gestational surrogacy with egg donation’ 
where a woman carries and gives birth to a child as a result of fertilization and implantation 
of a third-party donor’s egg.” Citing Ardis L. Campbell, Annotation, Determination of Status 
as Legal or Natural Parents in Contested Surrogacy Births, 77 A.L.R.5th 567, 574 § 2[a] 
(2000)). 
 143. Id. at 716. 
 144. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 716. 
 145. Id. at 721. 
 146. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(4) (2001). 
 147. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-302(5) (2001). 
 148. In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d at 724–27. 
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mother was the legal mother of the triplets.149  Finally, the court called upon 
the legislature to enact a “broadly applicable rule” to help resolve future 
surrogacy conflicts.150 
ii. In re Baby 
In re Baby was the first case that required Tennessee courts to 
interpret new legislation that defined surrogacy, while not explicitly 
authorizing surrogacy contracts.151  In this case, the surrogate successfully 
gave birth to a child, and all parties agreed it was best for the surrogate to 
nurse the child for a few days before the child traveled back to the intended 
parents’ home in Italy.152  Six days after the child’s birth, however, the 
surrogate filed an ex parte restraining order and sought an injunction to 
prohibit the child from international travel.153  After the juvenile court 
denied the surrogate’s motion and awarded custody of the child to the 
intended father, the surrogate filed a motion to alter the juvenile court’s 
original order of parentage.154  The surrogate argued that no surrogate birth 
took place since the intended parents were not married at the time of the 
birth.155  Then existing Tennessee law defined surrogacy as a process that 
could only be entered into by intended parents if they were married.156 
In an unpublished opinion, the Tennessee Court of Appeals upheld 
the disputed surrogacy contract despite the fact that the parties were not in 
full compliance with statutory mandates.157  Specifically, the court held that 
the surrogate could not keep the child simply because she changed her mind 
at the last minute.158  The court reasoned that it would be unjust and 
contrary to the intent of the legislature to abrogate a surrogacy contract 
solely because the intended parents were not married until after the child’s 
                                                 
 149. Id. at 727 (factors to be considered include genetics, intent, gestation, and the lack 
of controversy between genetic contributor and gestator). 
 150. Id. at 733. The legislature later enacted a statute that defined both traditional and 
gestational surrogacy, but stated the surrogate birth process was not authorized in Tennessee. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48) (2010). 
 151. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 807 (Tenn. 2014); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(C) 
(2010); a more detailed discussion of this statute is provided infra. 
 152. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 812, 816. 
 153. Id. at 816. 
 154. Id. at 816–17. The juvenile court previously entered a final order declaring that the 
surrogate and her husband terminated all parental rights. 
 155. Id. at 817 (noting the intended parents were married twenty days after the child’s 
birth). 
 156. Id. at 820–21. 
 157. The TN statute governing surrogacy contracts has since been amended, as 
discussed infra. In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *5, aff’d in part and rev’d in part by 447 
S.W.3d 807. At time of publication, the TN Court of Appeals decision was still unpublished. 
Only the unofficial citation is available. 
 158. In re Baby, 2013 WL 245039, at *5 (“Surrogate’s last-minute change of heart does 
not provide a reason to invalidate the final judgment approving the surrogacy contract.”). 
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birth.159  Significantly, the court further asserted that it would continue to 
enforce surrogacy contracts because such agreements do not violate public 
policy.160 
Recently, the Tennessee Supreme Court granted the surrogate’s 
petition for appeal.161  According to the court’s holding, public policy does 
not prohibit the enforcement of traditional surrogacy contracts, but it does 
impose restrictions.162  Specifically, the court stated “compensation to a 
traditional surrogate should not be contingent upon her surrender of the 
child or the termination of her parental rights.”163  The court also held that 
the parental rights of a legal parent may only be terminated subsequent to a 
judicial determination of what is in the best interest of the child.164  Thus, a 
surrogate, if deemed a legal parent, would maintain the same rights as any 
other parent (i.e. visitation rights etc.) unless a court determined her an unfit 
parent.165 
C. Surrogacy Legislation in Tennessee 
Both In re C.K.G. and In re Baby established the need for 
legislative action.  In each case, a clear, revised regulatory framework 
would have allowed for easier contractual interpretation. 
The legislation adopted in 2010 unambiguously defined both 
traditional and gestational surrogacy.166  Notably, the intended parents were 
defined as “husband” and “wife,” which gave rise to the disputed surrogacy 
claim in In re Baby.167  Further, the legislation provided for automatic 
termination of the surrogate’s parental rights and, thus, obviated the need 
for the intended parents to adopt the resulting child.168  This legislation, 
however, created significant confusion by stating that the statutory 
definitions of surrogacy “should not be construed to expressly authorize the 
surrogate birth process in Tennessee unless otherwise approved by the 
courts or the general assembly.”169  By not legalizing surrogacy contracts, 
                                                 
 159. Id. (“It would be absurd to adopt the position that this was not a surrogate birth 
because the Intended Parents were married 20 days after the birth of the child. The obvious 
intent is for the child to be raised in a stable, loving home by committed parents.”). 
 160. Id. at *4 (“Because such contracts violate no law, we will enforce them until the 
legislature instructs otherwise.”). 
 161. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d 817 (Tenn. 2014). 
 162. Id. at 826. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 828. 
 165. Id. at 833. (“Finally, termination of parental rights in an involuntary proceeding 
may not occur absent a finding that the parent is unfit or that substantial harm to the child 
will result if parental rights are not terminated.”). 
 166. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(A) (2014). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at § 36-1-102(48)(B). 
 169. Id. at § 36-1-102(48)(C). 
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this legislation placed some Tennessee families in a legal gray area and set 
the stage for future litigation over surrogacy contracts.170 
In 2013, the legislature attempted to resolve this situation by 
passing an amendment to the statute that further defines surrogacy.171  This 
amendment provides more detailed definitions that address the complexities 
of the traditional surrogacy process.172  Significantly, this amendment does 
not require that the intended parents be a married couple.173  This means an 
unmarried or a same-sex couple can now legally enter into a traditional 
surrogacy contract in Tennessee. Since this language expanded the number 
of persons who may enter a traditional surrogacy contract174 and the 
Tennessee Supreme Court recently found a traditional surrogacy contract 
enforceable, it seems that traditional surrogacy is now clearly legal in 
Tennessee.175  Gestational surrogacy contracts, however, are still not 
explicitly authorized in Tennessee as this amendment fails to address them 
and such contracts have not been addressed by Tennessee courts.176 
Even if a Tennessee state court approves of gestational surrogacy 
contracts, there will still be a significant need for a comprehensive 
surrogacy statute.  Without any regulation of such agreements, it is possible 
that parties could enter into quasi-legal gestational surrogacy contracts that 
include unconscionable terms and exploit surrogates.  Legislation that 
allows for freedom of contract while protecting surrogates is necessary to 
create greater opportunities for infertile couples to start families and allow 
surrogates to provide needed services. 
IV. FEMINIST VIEWS ON SURROGACY CONTRACTS 
Feminist scholars are among a vocal group of advocates that 
support allowing women greater access to reproductive choices.177  At the 
same time, however, feminists are concerned the surrogate birth process 
could be used to exploit women.178  It is important to address these feminist 
concerns in drafting surrogacy legislation in order to create provisions that 
allow women access to more reproductive options, while protecting all 
parties from entry into unconscionable contracts. 
                                                 
 170. See In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 835. 
 171. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-402 (2013). 
 172. Id. (defining embryo, embryo parentage, embryo relinquishment, embryo transfer, 
legal embryo custodian, and recipient intended parent). 
 173. Id. at § 36-2-402(6) (“‘Recipient intended parent’ means a person or persons who 
receive a relinquished embryo and who accepts full legal rights and responsibilities for such 
embryo and any child that may be born as a result of embryo transfer.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. In re Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 817. 
 176. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-102(48)(C) (2014). 
 177. Katherine B. Lieber, Note, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique of 
Surrogacy Be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 211 (1993). 
 178. Id. 
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A. Feminist Legal Theory 
It is imperative to note there are many differences within feminism. 
These differences in approach, emphasis, and objectives make sweeping 
generalizations about this theoretical framework difficult.179  However, it is 
possible to determine broad concepts of feminist legal theory. As a whole, 
feminists are “concerned with the implications of historic and contemporary 
exploitation of women within society, seeking the empowerment of women 
and the transformation of institutions dominated by men.”180  In addition to 
identifying areas for female advancement, feminism integrates practice and 
theory to bring about such changes.181  According to noted historian Linda 
Gordon, feminism is “an analysis of women’s subordination for the purpose 
of figuring out how to change it.”182  This integration of practice and theory 
has led many female lawyers to study legal reform and take action to 
advocate equal treatment for women under the law.183  For the purposes of 
this Note, feminist legal theory is defined as “that subset of ideas involving 
women and the law that is concerned with improving the condition or status 
of women.”184 
Surrogacy is of particular concern to feminists because society has 
historically defined women by their ability to bear children.185  While some 
feminist scholars and commentators view surrogacy in a positive light, as a 
technology that gives women more reproductive choices,186 other feminists 
argue surrogacy is simply another way to exploit women and continue to 
define them by their biological capacities.187  One commonality among the 
varying feminist viewpoints on this issue, however, is the acknowledgment 
                                                 
 179. Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminist Legal Theory, 13 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 13 (2005). 
 180. Id. at 14. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Linda Gordon, “The Struggle for Reproductive Freedom: Three Stages of 
Feminism,” in Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism 107 n.1 (Zillah R. 
Eisenstein ed., 1979). 
 183. See Susan J. Carroll, Gender Symposium, The Politics of Difference: Women 
Public Officials as Agents of Change, 5 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 11, 12–13 (1994) (noting the 
impact women in public office are having on public policies). 
 184. Gary Lawson, Feminist Legal Theories, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 328 
(1995) (citing Martha Minow, Beyond Universality, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 115, 116 
(“[W]hat does feminism ‘in law’ mean? I suggest, here too, an inclusive definition: Let us 
refer to feminist work in litigation, legislation, legal teaching, and legal theories to advance 
rights and opportunities for women.”). 
 185. Norma Juliet Wikler, Society’s Response to the New Reproductive Technologies: 
The Feminist Perspectives, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1986) (stating that the social role 
of women has been controlled by their capacity to give birth). 
 186. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Motherhood: The Challenge for Feminists, 
in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: POLITICS AND PRIVACY 167, 168 (Lawrence O. Gostin ed., 
1990) (presenting the feminist argument that reproductive “developments added up to the 
freedom to be a surrogate”). 
 187. Wikler, supra note 185, at 1043–44. 
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that one of the underlying purposes of the feminist movement is to allow 
women more control over their reproductive choices.188 
B. Feminist Arguments in Favor of Surrogacy 
Historically, the increase in reproductive choices available to 
women has played an important role in the development of women’s 
rights.189  As a result of celebrated Supreme Court decisions, women now 
have the right to access contraceptives, the right to use artificial 
insemination, the right to control the progress of pregnancy, and the right to 
end a pregnancy through abortion.190 
Feminist scholars in favor of surrogacy argue that surrogacy 
arrangements give women more reproductive options.191  Noted feminist 
scholar Shulamith Firestone asserts that new reproductive options like 
surrogacy allow for a reevaluation of the role of women in society.192  
Firestone posits that surrogacy is a positive step in reproductive technology 
because it allows for another reproductive option, thus granting women 
further control over the biological processes that have historically defined 
them.193  Moreover, Ms. Firestone frames the feminist argument for 
surrogacy forcefully stating new reproductive technologies have the 
potential to “free women and the entire human species from the tyranny of 
biological destiny.”194  Firestone’s argument is premised on the idea that 
new reproductive technologies like surrogacy will redistribute the 
emotional, psychological, and physical strains of pregnancy resulting in 
societal rejection of the notion that all women are meant to give birth.195 
Pro-surrogacy feminists also draw comparisons between surrogacy 
and sperm donation.196  When men donate sperm they are permitted to 
contractually declare they will not retain legal ties to any child that may 
result from the use of their sperm.197  By contrast, a surrogate’s choice to 
relinquish all legal rights to the child she gestates is sometimes viewed as 
                                                 
 188. See id. at 1043. 
 189. Lieber, supra note 177, at 212. 
 190. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding 
the constitutional right to an abortion); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & 
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (recognizing that the right to an abortion flows from the 
right to privacy); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the right of women to 
access abortions); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (asserting the implied 
fundamental right of married couples to access contraceptive devices). 
 191. See CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY, 146–47 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1989) (discussing feminist arguments in favor of surrogacy). 
 192. Id. at 147. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 146. 
 195. Id. at 147 (describing Firestone’s view that new reproductive choices present 
opportunities for the re-examination of women’s roles in society). 
 196. Andrews, supra note 186, at 170. 
 197. Id. 
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“baby [-] selling” or a form of reproductive prostitution.198  According to 
many feminists, the progress of reproductive freedom should not be limited 
because of societal perceptions about the role of motherhood.199  Moreover, 
courts and legal scholars question whether or not a woman has the capacity 
to even relinquish all rights to a child she gestates because of supposed 
maternal ties that will never abate, while it is widely accepted that a man is 
capable of signing away any potential rights to a child born of his sperm.200  
This inconsistency illustrates how societal concepts of motherhood affect 
the analysis of surrogacy arrangements by assigning more agency to men 
than women in making procreational choices.201 
C. Feminist Arguments Against Commercial Surrogacy Contracts 
Though some feminists advocate for surrogacy as simply another 
advancement of reproductive technology that offers women more 
procreative choices, other feminists warn that surrogacy presents significant 
potential for economic and social exploitation.202  Noted radical feminist 
Andrea Dworkin, for example, argued that surrogacy is analogous to 
prostitution in that both are ways for society to put a price on women’s 
bodies—something that is not typical of the way society views men’s 
bodies.203  Dworkin suggested that the purpose of surrogacy is to separate 
the idea of the womb from the woman giving birth, effectively turning the 
womb into a commodity.204  The commodification of child bearing will lead 
society to value women solely for their reproductive capabilities according 
to Dworkin.205 
Dworkin also argued that societal control over women exists in two 
forms that can be described as the brothel model and the farming model.206  
These are defined as follows: 
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The brothel model relates to prostitution, narrowly defined; 
women collected together for the purposes of sex with 
men; women whose function is explicitly non-
reproductive . . . . The farming model relates to 
motherhood, women as a class planted with the male seed 
and harvested.”207 
In Dworkin’s view, new reproductive technologies are shifting the method 
of exercising control over women from the farming model to the brothel 
model by separating the process of child bearing from the act of sexual 
intercourse.208  Under Dworkin’s analysis, this separates the womb from the 
women, leaving society with a fragmented picture of womanhood.209  The 
ability to pay to rent a womb will result in the exploitation of women and 
the commercialization of women’s bodies, according to anti-surrogacy 
feminists.210  Similar to Dworkin’s analysis, other feminists argue that 
surrogates could potentially become a separate class of breeders resulting in 
society relegating them to, at least an ideological, “reproductive brothel.”211 
According to feminists that oppose surrogacy, the decision to 
relinquish custody of a child is never truly voluntary.212  Indeed, some 
researchers believe that given the relational complexities of surrogacy 
agreements and the fact that “social implications of surrogacy are largely 
unknown, it seems difficult if not impossible for a potential surrogate to 
give informed consent.”213  Many feminists advance this logic as the main 
reason that surrogacy arrangements should not be enforced, specifically; a 
contract without fully informed consent should not be enforced as it 
violates public policy.214  This argument is based on the belief that 
hormonal changes during pregnancy are unpredictable and may cause a 
woman to change her mind about relinquishing all parental rights to her 
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child after he or she is born.215  Both of these arguments, however, 
disregard the meaning of informed consent in the contract context. In any 
other contract, one party may not spontaneously disregard his or her 
contractual obligations simply because he or she had a change of heart.216  
These arguments are particularly dangerous because they imply that women 
are incapable of entering legally binding contracts.217  Indeed, this rationale 
that women lacked legal capacity was advanced in the nineteenth century to 
support laws that prevented women from owning property or voting.218  
Feminist proponents of surrogacy respond to anti-surrogacy feminists by 
arguing that failure to enforce surrogacy contracts based on this rationale 
suggests by virtue of being born female, a woman cannot truly consent to 
certain contracts.219 
In light of the above considerations, surrogacy contracts present 
courts, legislatures, and lawyers with a unique tension between the ideals of 
allowing freedom of contract and the desire to protect women from 
exploitation.  While there are still potential risks associated with surrogacy, 
proper legislation can provide a regulatory framework that balances 
feminist concerns with freedom of contract principles. 
V. THE INTERSECTION OF FREEDOM TO CONTRACT & PUBLIC POLICY 
CONSIDERATIONS 
Surrogacy contracts implicate the bodily integrity of the surrogate 
as well as the rights of the intended parents to procreate.220  There is a 
tension between allowing the intended parents to contract freely, and 
ensuring surrogacy contracts do not violate public policy by exploiting 
women or encouraging unconscionable contracts.221  It is necessary to 
explore these concerns to understand how appropriately drafted surrogacy 
legislation can provide for greater freedom of contract while balancing 
important public policy objectives. 
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A. Freedom of Contract Principles as Related to Surrogacy 
Since it is a well-established principle of contract law that a court 
may choose not to enforce a contract that violates public policy, it is 
imperative to closely examine the public policy concerns raised by 
surrogacy contracts.222  Surrogacy contracts are unique in that they involve 
one or more persons contracting for the provision of labor that implicates 
the bodily integrity of a third party.223  Some legal scholars see this as 
nothing more than a contract for a womb, or even as analogous to the 
selling of one’s body as a prostitute, and thus argue that these contracts 
should not be enforced since they violate public policy.224  Conversely, 
other legal practitioners contend that surrogacy contracts should be 
enforced, but caution that such contracts should be carefully drafted and 
provide for the many complex situations surrogacy arrangements create.225 
Professor Richard Epstein argues a surrogate’s freedom to contract 
should be respected.226  He notes that simply because the contract involves 
giving birth does not necessarily mean that the surrogate loses her 
autonomy, or is subject to exploitation.227  Specifically, he posits: 
 
To argue that these contractual terms are inconsistent with 
the autonomy of the surrogate mother is to miss the 
function of all contractual arrangements over labor. Full 
control over their own bodies and labor is what 
autonomous individuals have before they contract. The 
process of contracting always requires a surrender of some 
portion of autonomy, but only in exchange for things that 
are thought to be more valuable.228 
 
Epstein goes on to argue that a clear legal framework would lead to greater 
certainty about the enforceability of surrogacy contracts and result in a 
more comprehensive understanding of the surrogate’s rights and obligations 
vis-à-vis those of the intended parents.229  According to Epstein, full 
disclosure of objectives, risks, and compensation would alleviate confusion 
                                                 
 222. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 5.1 (2d ed. 2000) 
(discussing two rationales for using public policy to invalidate a contract: (1) a court “may 
see its refusal as an appropriate sanction to discourage undesirable conduct” or (2) it “may 
regard enforcement of the promise as an inappropriate use of the judicial process to uphold 
an unsavory agreement.”). 
 223. See Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 
81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2317–18 (1995). 
 224. See Wilson, supra note 84, at 330. 
 225. See Epstein, supra note 223, at 2317. 
 226. Id. at 2335. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. See id. at 2339. 
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between the contracting parties and result in fully informed consent of all 
parties and, ultimately, a viable contract.230 
Legal scholars, foremost among them Richard Posner, advance an 
economic efficiency argument in support of free market adoptions that also 
supports the enforcement of surrogacy contracts.231  Posner describes 
trading monetary compensation for a child as efficient, since the parties 
would not agree to it “if they did not think it would make both of them 
better off.”232  This analysis, like Epstein’s, relies on the classic economic 
model of the rational actor and suggests individuals should be allowed to 
contract efficiently for their personal benefit.233 
Both Posner and Epstein advocate for greater opportunities for 
childless couples to become parents and ground their arguments in freedom 
to contract and economic efficiency principles.  By making surrogacy 
arrangements faster and easier to enter into, surrogates will be able to aid 
childless couples or individuals in having a family of their own.  As long as 
these contracts are not violative of public policy, they should be enforced. 
D. Public Policy Concerns: Comparisons to Prostitution and Human 
Trafficking 
Vocal opponents of surrogacy argue against enforcement of such 
contracts and predict that attempts to enforce these arrangements will lead 
to exploitation of women and the weakening of American families.234  Two 
of the most frequently invoked public policy arguments against surrogacy 
analogize surrogacy to prostitution235 and human trafficking.236  It is 
necessary to examine these contentions to discover if they are valid, and 
whether or not proper legislation could address these concerns while 
allowing surrogates and intended parents to freely contract. 
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i. Comparison to Prostitution 
Some scholars and commentators view surrogacy as a form of 
adultery or prostitution.237  They point out that both prostitutes and 
surrogates sell their bodies for money, typically out of economic 
necessity.238  These scholars conclude that since prostitution is illegal for 
moral reasons, surrogacy should also be proscribed.239 
This argument is unavailing for two reasons.  First, the enforcement 
of contracts should not be blocked merely because non-parties to the 
contract disapprove of the agreement.240  According to Professor Epstein, 
morality is not a sufficient reason to criminalize surrogacy contracts.241  
Additionally, in regard to reproductive rights the Supreme Court has 
explicitly stated that morality alone cannot be the basis for a law: 
 
Men and women of good conscience can disagree, and we 
suppose some always shall disagree, about the profound 
moral and spiritual implications of terminating a 
pregnancy, even in its earliest stage.  Some of us as 
individuals find abortion offensive to our most basic 
principles of morality, but that cannot control our decision.  
Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate 
our own moral code.242 
 
Moral concerns alone should not control the enforcement of surrogacy 
contracts.243  Accordingly, surrogacy contracts should be upheld as long as 
they do not violate existing law or significant public policy objectives.244 
Second, the goals of surrogacy contracts are vastly different from 
that of prostitution.  It is important to evaluate why individuals seek 
prostitutes versus why individuals seek surrogates.  While the use of a 
woman’s body is implicated in each arrangement, the goal of a transaction 
with a prostitute is sexual gratification.245  By contrast, the result of 
contracting with a surrogate is the birth of a child the intended parents seek 
to raise as their own.246  Moreover, individuals seeking to become parents 
through surrogacy desire to expand their family and exercise their 
                                                 
 237. David R. Bromham, Surrogacy: Ethical, Legal, and Social Aspects, 12 J. OF 
ASSISTED REPROD. AND GENETICS 509, 510–11 (1995). 
 238. See Hill, supra note 210, at 641–42. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Epstein, supra note 223, at 2341. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992). 
 243. See id. 
 244. See Farnsworth, supra note 222, at § 5.1. 
 245. See Hill, supra note 210, at 641. 
 246. Id. 
2015] GESTATIONAL SURROGACY CONTRACTS IN TENNESSEE 295 
constitutionally protected right to be a parent,247 while individuals seeking 
prostitutes cannot claim any constitutionally protected right.  Accordingly, 
these transactions appear too disparate to warrant any substantial 
comparison. 
ii. Comparison to Human Trafficking 
Another common argument against surrogacy is that the process is 
tantamount to human trafficking or black-market adoptions.248  This 
argument, however, fails to take into account the motivations of the parties 
and the legal framework of many states that provides for freedom of 
contract while safeguarding women from exploitation in both adoption and 
surrogacy arrangements. 
The fees paid in commercial surrogacy agreements are better 
understood as compensation for services, rather than payment for a child.249  
Paying a surrogate for her services should be viewed as similar to paying a 
reproductive center for artificial insemination or other fertility treatments 
that are commonly used to assist couples in conceiving a child.250  Despite 
the fact that paying a surrogate may be controversial, payment may be 
necessary to a functioning surrogacy system.251  It is likely that the number 
of women willing to be surrogates would drop precipitously if there were 
no possibility of compensation.252  Thus, although controversial, payment 
for surrogacy is a necessary aspect of a thriving surrogacy regime.253  When 
viewed as payment for services, and not payment for a child, the human 
trafficking comparison becomes tenuous at best.  Consequently, since 
surrogacy is not equivalent to human trafficking, surrogacy arrangements 
should not be banned on this ground. 
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VI. CAN STATUTORY PROVISIONS BALANCE COMPETING CONCERNS? 
While scholars such as Epstein and Posner focus on the ability of 
parties to enter into agreements that result in a net benefit to society, 
feminist scholars are primarily concerned with preventing the exploitation 
of women.  Properly drafted legislation can ensure that individuals enjoy 
greater freedom to contract while protecting significant public policy 
interests.  These concerns are addressed by the proposed legislation infra. 
A. Proposed Surrogacy Statute for Tennessee 
The following is a proposed statute to amend Tennessee’s current 
provisions regulating surrogacy.  It combines elements from other state 
statutes around the country to create a comprehensive statutory surrogacy 
framework.  This proposed legislation explicitly authorizes various 
surrogacy arrangements, while providing for regulation to prevent 
exploitation and advance legitimate public policy goals. 
 
Article 1: Definitions 
(1) Surrogate: A woman who agrees to enter a surrogacy 
contract.254 
 
(2) Intended Parent(s): A person or persons seeking to 
conceive a child via assisted reproductive technologies who 
enter a surrogacy contract.  Such person(s) will be 
considered the legal parents of the resulting child upon 
birth. The term shall include the intended mother, intended 
father, or both.255 
 
(3) Traditional Surrogacy: The Surrogate or intended mother is 
artificially inseminated with sperm belonging to either the 
intended father or an anonymous donor.  The egg used in 
the procedure belongs to the Surrogate.256 
 
(4) Gestational Surrogacy: The process by which a woman 
seeks to carry and give birth to a child for the intended 
parents.  This process occurs when: (1) a fertilized ovum, 
created from an egg of the intended mother or that of an 
anonymous donor, and the sperm of the intended father or 
that of an anonymous donor; (2) is placed in the 
Surrogate’s uterus.257 
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Article 2: Authorization of Surrogacy Contracts 
Surrogacy contracts are explicitly authorized, and as such legally 
enforceable.  This includes traditional, gestational, commercial, and 
non-commercial arrangements.  All such agreements are subject to 
the limitations listed in Article 3. 
 
Article 3: Limitations and Guidelines 
The validity of all surrogacy contracts will be based on judicial 
determination that: 
 
a. All parties to the contract are over 18 years of age.258 
 
b. All parties to the agreement have voluntarily entered such 
agreement and understand the terms.259 
 
c. None of the parties have a criminal record260 of child abuse 
or violent crime. 
 
d. Intended parent(s) have the financial means to provide for 
the resulting child.261   
 
e. Intended parent(s) are unable to conceive a child.262 
 
f. Surrogate has previously conceived, and gestated a fetus, 
which resulted in a live birth.263 
 
g. All parties have undergone a physical and psychological 
evaluation.264 
 
h. The contract includes a detailed payment schedule.265 
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i. The intended parent(s) and the surrogate have consulted 
with separate legal counsel.266 
 
j. The parties are engaging in this process through a validly 
licensed reproductive clinic. 
B. The Proposed Statute Allows for Greater Freedom of Contract 
While Addressing Public Policy Concerns 
The goal of this legislative provision is to maximize the number of 
surrogacy contracts while preventing exploitation of women.  This 
legislative amendment protects the reproductive rights of men and women 
in Tennessee.  The choice to hire a surrogate is innately linked to the right 
of reproductive choice and grounded in the right to privacy as well as the 
freedom to contract.  Under the Tennessee Constitution, Tennesseans 
arguably enjoy greater privacy protections than guaranteed in the federal 
Constitution.267  In keeping with the spirit of allowing greater privacy 
protection, this legislation explicitly authorizes traditional, gestational, 
commercial, and non-commercial surrogacy so that individuals will not be 
unduly limited in exercising their right to procreative decision-making. 
Though it is vital to protect reproductive freedoms and privacy 
rights, these rights should not lead to the exploitation of others.  Under the 
existing surrogacy legislation in Tennessee, a couple could potentially enter 
a surrogacy contract with a seventeen year-old girl in desperate need of 
money without working with a validly licensed fertility center.  Such a 
situation might involve coercion, duress, or entering into a contract with 
unconscionable terms.  When such a complicated medical procedure is 
involved, there should be greater safeguards to ensure the wellbeing of all 
parties.  Predicating entry into a surrogacy contract on an age requirement 
as well as physical and psychological evaluations allows all parties greater 
knowledge of extenuating circumstances that could affect the pregnancy, 
and helps to ensure that the surrogate can give informed consent. By 
creating specific legal parameters for these contracts, this proposed 
legislation permits contracts that will equitably achieve the goals of all 
parties. 
Though this statute allows for commercial surrogacy contracts, 
which may concern some feminists who see potential for base 
commercialization of women’s bodies, allowing payment for surrogacy 
within a legal framework can protect women in these situations.268  If solely 
non-commercial surrogacy is authorized, this could incentivize intended 
parents to illicitly pay women for these services.  Since demand for 
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surrogates currently exceeds supply,269 it is plausible that some form of 
commercial inducement would occur if commercial surrogacy were not 
authorized.  Moreover, there is significant concern that without proper 
regulation, surrogacy may become a black market industry that provides 
insufficient legal recourse for those who may be exploited.270  Allowing 
commercial surrogacy and regulating these arrangements will ideally quell 
potential illicit transactions.  This legislative amendment would allow 
women who wish to become surrogates to offer a needed service to infertile 
couples and establish legal parameters for such contracts that take into 
account important public policy considerations by ensuring that all parties 
to the contract give informed consent. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In Tennessee, gestational surrogacy is not expressly authorized.  
This means that while gestational surrogacy arrangements are not subject to 
civil or criminal penalties, gestational surrogacy remains an area of the law 
that the legislature has declined to regulate.  The lack of clear law on this 
matter is a disservice to the public.  As the proposed legislation in this Note 
suggests, a comprehensive surrogacy statute should clearly define the legal 
parameters of surrogacy contracts and provide for the protection of all 
parties involved.  Gestational surrogacy should be explicitly authorized in 
Tennessee to permit greater freedom of contract and allow for more 
reproductive choice, especially in light of Tennessee’s enhanced protections 
for the right to privacy.  Even if the legislature does not enact new 
surrogacy legislation, surrogacy arrangements will likely continue and 
ultimately the judiciary will be left with the task of interpreting these 
contracts.  In the past, this has led to inconsistent results as well as judicial 
requests for legislative action.  Adopting a new statute will inform the 
public as to what types of surrogacy are legal and regulate who can enter 
into such agreements.  In conclusion, by regulating surrogacy, Tennessee 
can further the significant public policy goals of allowing expanded 
reproductive options while simultaneously permitting greater freedom of 
contract. 
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